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ABSTRACT
We address the exchange rate determination puzzle by examining how information is aggregated
in a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) setting. Unlike other DGE macro models, which enrich
either preference structures or production structures, our model enriches the information structure.
The model departs from microstructure-style modeling by identifying the real activities where
dispersed information originates, as well as the technology by which information is subsequently
aggregated and impounded. Results relevant to the determination puzzle include: (1) persistent gaps
between exchange rates and macro fundamentals, (2) excess volatility relative to macro
fundamentals, (3) exchange rate movements without macro news, (4) little or no exchange rate
movement when macro news occurs, and (5) a structural-economic rationale for why transaction
flows perform well in accounting for monthly exchange rate changes, whereas macro variables
perform poorly. Though past micro analysis has made progress on results (1) through (3), results (4)
and (5) are new. Excess volatility arises in our model for a new reason: rational exchange rate errors
feed back into the fundamentals that the exchange rate is trying to track.
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Two micro-founded approaches to exchange rates emerged in the 1990s, but there remains a
distressing disconnect between them. This paper addresses whether connecting them can resolve
the most researched puzzle in international macroeconomics: the fact that macro fundamentals do
not explain monthly exchange rate changes (the determination puzzle; see Meese and Rogoﬀ 1983).
The two approaches that emerged are the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) approach and the mi-
crostructure approach.2 DGE modeling is increasingly rich in its preference structures (tastes) and
production structures (technology), but has not yet ventured beyond common-knowledge informa-
tion structures (e.g., toward information that originates in a dispersed form). The microstructure
approach, in contrast, is focused on richer information structures, at the cost of relying on rather
stylized, partial equilibrium analysis (e.g., informative signals are introduced without ever specify-
ing what the deep economic fundamentals are, and without ever considering that the fundamentals
themselves are determined in part by the signals received). The "new micro" approach we propose
here connects the two.3 The model embeds a micro process of information aggregation into a macro
DGE setting.
In this paper we adopt stochastic productivity as the driving force behind the exchange rate.
By going this route, we have chosen to anchor exchange rate determination with a real factor,
though this is not necessary. (The information approach is ￿exible enough to accommodate, for
example, shocks to money demands, or shocks to risk preferences.) Anchoring exchange rates
with a real factor shows that our information dynamics are not special to ￿nancial transactions
and the associated nominal variables. The essential ingredient is that individuals￿ currency trades
are more correlated with (unobserved) shocks to home-country productivity than with shocks to
foreign productivity. We have in mind an economy in which bits of information about realized
productivity are present initially at the micro level, i.e., at the level of individual ￿rms. No one
of these ￿rms considers itself to have superior information. But if the currency trades of these
individual ￿rms are correlated with their own micro-level productivities, then aggregated trades
initiated by home agents convey incremental information about the home shock. This information
structure diﬀerentiates the macro side of our model from the DGE macro literature. Beyond this,
the macro features of our model are quite standard, in fact rather streamlined. There is a continuum
2DGE examples include Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995,1998), and Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2002), among many others. Use of signed transaction quantities, the hallmark of microstructure
analysis, includes Lyons (1995), Rime (2001), Evans (2002), Evans and Lyons (2002a), Bjonnes and Rime (2003),
and Payne (2003), among many others.
3Though "new micro" analysis relies heavily on the theory of microstructure ￿nance, it draws only from the
information branch of microstructure modeling and addresses diﬀerent questions, hence the need for a label other
than microstructure. (New micro is oriented toward macro questions, whereas microstructure ￿nance is oriented
toward micro questions such as institution design, regulation, individual behavior, and partial-equilibrium price
determination.)
1of agents in each of the two countries, with utility de￿ned over consumption of a home and a foreign
good. Agents have access to two ￿nancial assets, home- and foreign-currency deposits, which pay
interest monthly.
The micro features of the model are closely related to microeconomic models of asset trade.
In these models, ￿nancial intermediaries act as marketmakers who provide two-way prices. We
introduce liquidity provision of this type by assuming that all agents engage in both consumption
and marketmaking.4 This consolidates the activities of households with that of ￿nancial institutions
in a way similar to the ￿yeoman farmer￿ consolidation of consumption and production decisions
in the new-macro branch of DGE models. The consolidation greatly facilitates integration of
elements from the microstructure approach into a DGE setting.5 In particular, it ensures that the
objectives of ￿nancial-market participants are exactly aligned with those of consumers. All trading
is therefore consistent with expected utility maximization; noise traders, behavioral traders, and
other non-rational agent types are absent.
The model shows that richer￿and more realistic￿information structures produce exchange
rate behavior that aligns closely with empirical facts. With respect to the determination puzzle in
particular, relevant results include: (1) persistent gaps between exchange rates and macro funda-
mentals, (2) excess volatility relative to macro fundamentals, (3) exchange rate movements without
macro news, and (4) little or no exchange rate movement when macro news occurs. Intuition for
these results is as follows. Persistent gaps between exchange rates and fundamentals arise because
the underlying state of fundamentals￿which corresponds to the union of all information sets￿is
revealed only gradually. Though exchange rates fully re￿ect all public information, they never
re￿ect all information. Volatility in excess of fundamentals occurs because real allocations are
distorted by rational exchange rate errors￿an "embedding eﬀect"; these distorted real allocations
induce additional volatility in exchange rates.6 (Note that past micro models of exchange rates
cannot produce excess volatility from this source since they do not permit feedback from informa-
tion and exchange rates back to fundamentals.) Exchange rates move without macro news because
microeconomic actions￿in particular, trades￿convey information, even when public macro news
is not present. On the ￿ipside, there may be no impact on exchange rates from macro news if prior
microeconomic aggregation of information renders that news redundant (this being another result
4Note the emphasis here on liquidity provision that is private, in contrast to the public provision of liquidity (in
the form of central banks) at the center of the monetary approach to exchange rates.
5To non-macro readers this type of consolidation is surely unfamiliar. The assumption facilitates general equi-
librium analysis because the agent population remains de￿ned over a single continuum, and diﬀerences along that
continuum arise as parsimoniously as possible to capture the model￿s essential features.
6For further intuition on embedding, recognize that the exchange rate, as an asset price, is free to jump, whereas
real variables (like total output) are not. Suppose home agents over-estimate real ouput and consume too much today
(resulting in part from an overvalued real exchange rate). The following period the exchange rate must depreciate
from its over-valued level, not only enough to reduce consumption to re￿ect lower-than-expected output, but also to
compensate for the distorted consumption decision.
2that is new to micro modeling).
This paper belongs to a recent theoretical literature that emerged to address why exchange
rates are so well explained by signed transaction ￿o w s( e . g . ,4 0t o8 0p e r c e n to fd a i l yc h a n g e s
explained, for a host of major currencies; see Evans and Lyons 2002a,b). Our model shows why
signed transaction ￿ows should have better explanatory power than macro variables. The basic
idea is that, in a setting of dispersed information, aggregate transaction ￿ows provide a stronger
signal of changing macro fundamentals. The model of Hau and Rey (2002) goes a diﬀerent route in
addressing the empirical signi￿cance of transaction ￿ows by introducing two elements: a central role
f o rc r o s s - bo r d e re q u i t y￿ows and a private-sector supply of foreign exchange that is price elastic. The
latter means that cross-border equity ￿ows aﬀect exchange rates via induced currency transactions.
In a nutshell, their focus for understanding currency movements is on shocks in equity markets, a
substantial departure from the traditional asset approach which emphasizes instead the importance
of bond markets. Their focus is not on information aggregation as ours is here (no information
aggregation takes place in their model). A second paper along this theoretical line is Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2003), which does explicitly address how transaction ￿ows relate to information
aggregation. Their model is a rational-expectations model of trade (in the spirit of Grossman
and Stiglitz 1980). An important ￿nding in that paper is that greater dispersion of information
across agents can lead to greater price impact from non-fundamental trades (resulting from rational
confusion of non-fundamental trades for fundamental trades). Our modeling departs from theirs
in two main ways. First, our DGE setting extends "upstream" in the information process in that
it speci￿es the structural source of the information that currency markets need to aggregate (i.e.,
the underlying economic activities that produce it.) Second, marketmaking in our model aligns
closely with actual institutions, so empirical implications are readily implementable with existing
data. A third recent paper, Devereux and Engel (2002), shares both our DGE approach and
a role for marketmakers, but nevertheless maintains a common-knowledge information structure.
Marketmakers in their model are explicitly non-rational.7
The dispersed information we address here is qualitatively diﬀerent than concentrated informa-
tion, where one or a few "insiders" have large information advantages (and know it).8 It is dispersed
information that characterizes most variables at the center of exchange rate modeling, such as out-
put, money demand, in￿ation, consumption preferences, and risk preferences. These variables are
not realized at the macro level, but rather as aggregations of underlying micro realizations. For
7In a risk-neutral setting, the trades of marketmakers in the Devereux and Engel (2002) model would not aﬀect
price: they convey no cash-￿ow information and, with risk neutrality, they cannot aﬀect risk premia (also true of the
non-rational traders in Jeanne and Rose 2002). In contrast, trades of marketmakers in our model would still aﬀect
price under risk neutrality because they do so by aﬀecting expected cash ￿ows.
8In this way, the model abstracts from strategic behavior at the individual level. Strategic interaction is important
for understanding collapsing ￿xed exchange rates (see, e.g., Corsetti et al. 2001), but less important for the everyday
functioning of major ￿oating-rate currencies.
3some of these measures, such as risk preferences and money demands, oﬃcial aggregations of the
underlying micro-level shocks do not exist, leaving the full task of aggregation to markets. For other
variables, oﬃcial aggregations exist, but publication trails underlying realizations by 1-4 months,
leaving much room for market-based aggregation in advance of publication. (Even after publication
there is room for market-based aggregation: initial publication is often noisy, as evidenced by large
subsequent revisions.) Existing macro models of exchange rates do not admit information that
requires aggregation by markets. Instead, relevant information is either symmetric economy-wide,
or, in some models, asymmetrically assigned to a single agent￿the central bank. This is at odds
with empirical evidence, which shows that dispersed information is indeed being impounded by
markets.9 The challenge is modeling the mechanics of this information process and how markets
implement it.
Methodologically, the DGE environment we study has a number of novel features. First, ￿nan-
cial markets in our model are incomplete, which, among other things, makes room for the exchange
rate to be determined from more than just the marginal rate of substitution between home and
foreign consumption goods (see Duarte and Stockman 2001). In particular, the exchange rate is
pinned down by expectations via a present-value relation in a manner familiar to the asset ap-
proach. Second, the model embeds social learning: agents learn from the equilibrium actions of
others. Third, the presence of social learning means that we need to solve each agent￿s decision
problem and inference problem jointly. More concretely, the solution begins with a conjecture about
each agent￿s information set, and concludes with veri￿cation that these conjectured information sets
line up with information provided by market outcomes. Fourth, our solution accounts for agent
risk aversion. Risks associated with incomplete knowledge about the economy￿s state in￿uence
consumption and trading decisions (which, in turn, aﬀect the inferences agents draw from market
outcomes). To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to solve a DGE model with this combination
of risk-averse decision-making, heterogeneous information, and social learning.
Our DGE methodology highlights several implications of dispersed information that are not
evident from partial equilibrium microstructure analysis. First, though the timing of information
receipt is exogenous, the timing of impounding in price is endogenous. This is because the market
signals that lead to that impounding are themselves endogenous. Second, DGE modeling of price
discovery shows that real decisions are aﬀected, with the degree depending on the pace of (endoge-
nous) revelation. Accordingly, in a DGE setting such as this, one can address questions such as,
What is the welfare-optimal pace of revelation? (It is well known that fast revelation may not be
9This evidence is from both micro studies of individual price setters and macro studies of price setting marketwide.
See, e.g., the papers noted in footnote 2, as well as Covrig and Melvin (2002), Froot and Ramadorai (2002), and Evans
and Lyons (2002b). The basic idea here is that demand is playing two distinct roles: the traditional market-clearing
role and a non-traditional information-communication role.
4optimal because, for example, it can impede risk sharing.) Third, the information structure of the
DGE model provides needed clarity on why transaction eﬀects on exchange rates should persist
and, importantly, whether that persistence applies to real exchange rates or only to nominal rates.10
Persistence will apply to real exchange rates if, for example, signed transaction ￿ow is conveying
information about underlying real shocks that are themselves permanent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents some over-arching
characteristics of the model. Details of the model are laid out formally in Section 2. Section 3
describes the steps involved in solving for equilibrium. Section 4 studies the equilibrium, with
particular focus on pricing dynamics at both high frequencies and low. Propositions there address
the pace of revelation, the embedding of mistakes in fundamentals, and excess volatility. In Section
5, we address various other implications of interest (e.g., announcement eﬀects, trading volume,
and the information content of diﬀerent ￿ow measures). Section 6 concludes. An appendix presents
the paper￿s analytical detail.
1 Theoretical Overview
Our intention is to lay out a new genre of information model, one that identi￿es primitive shocks and
their propagation in ways that partial-equilibrium models cannot. This new genre of model will have
three essential ingredients: (i) it needs to specify an endowment process (or production technology)
for dispersed information, (ii) it needs to specify the information available for ￿nancial pricing, and
(iii) it needs a solution methodology that maps individual information sets into equilibrium actions
that, once observed, support those individual information sets. The model below is but one set of
choices in these three dimensions. In its presentation, we touch on other options so that those with
modeling preferences diﬀerent from ours will have a sense of the wider possibilities.
The ￿rst of these essential ingredients￿speci￿cation of dispersed information￿is a qualitative
departure from existing DGE work in macro. Rather than enriching the preference structure (tastes)
or production structure (technology), this genre of model enriches the information structure. In
departing from common knowledge, the focus is on price eﬀects from information that persist, not
on ￿microstructure eﬀects￿ (where by the latter we mean transitory price eﬀects from marketmaker
risk management, or from bouncing between bid and ask prices); from a macro perspective, these
microstructure eﬀects are second order. The fundamental driver of the model we present is real
10With respect to the information conveyed by ￿ows, it is important to distinguish order ￿ows from portfolio ￿ows.
Order ￿ows￿by tracking the initiating side of transactions￿are a theoretically sound way to distinguish shifts
in demand curves from movements along demand curves. Informationally, the two are diﬀerent: there is news in
curve shifts, but no news in price-induced movements along known curves (the latter representing a type of feedback
trading). For portfolio ￿ows, theory provides little guidance on which ￿ows in the aggregate mix re￿ect the news,
i.e., the demand-curve shifts. We return to this when discussing implications of the model in section 5.
5productivity. But as noted, we could just as easily set up the model with another real shock
as the fundamental driver, or with a nominal shock as the fundamental driver (e.g., assuming
that individuals￿ trades are correlated with unobserved shocks to home money demand). Finally,
for those interested in integrating sticky goods prices and imperfectly competitive ￿rms, these
key features of open-macro modeling could be introduced in the usual way. We chose the most
streamlined structure possible to highlight the new information dimension.
The second essential ingredient￿speci￿cation of the information available for ￿nancial pricing￿
really embeds two elements. The ￿rst is that ￿nancial pricing needs to be grounded in well-
speci￿ed decision problems. Our model makes this explicit. Second, and more important, any
explicit model of liquidity provision needs to take a stand on information sets: what information
do agents have at their disposal for setting transactable prices? To get traction on this front,
the genre of models we work with here relaxes (realistically) the common but extreme assumption
that information aggregation takes place instantaneously (i.e., before any transactions take place;
see, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). When information aggregation takes place instantaneously,
the resulting transaction information conveys no information that is not already embedded in
the transaction price. There is no learning from order ￿ow ex post, and indeed, no information
value to transaction ￿ows whatsoever (both radically counterfactual implications).11 In the model
below, we choose instead a ￿simultaneous trade￿ design (see, e.g., Lyons 1997). The simultaneous
trade design speci￿es simultaneous actions, in the sense that trading at any point in time occurs
simultaneously throughout the economy (in the spirit of simultaneous-move games in game theory).
In essence, this imposes a constraint on the information available for making trading decisions
because simultaneous moves cannot be conditioned on one another. More concretely, one cannot
condition on the actual trading intentions of all other agents in the economy at the time one chooses
to trade (save doing one￿s best to forecast them). We ￿nd this an inherently realistic assumption.
Though a convenient way to relax the extreme assumption of instantaneous aggregation, it is
certainly not the only possibility for the genre. For example, one could also take an intermediate
road and assume that ￿nancial transactions at any ￿point￿ in time are executed sequentially (a la
Glosten and Milgrom 1985). In this case, the earlier the trade in the sequence, the more limited
the conditioning information (because early trades cannot condition on information conveyed by
later trades). This alternative produces the same qualitative constraint on information sets used
for pricing that we employ here.
The third essential ingredient of this modeling genre is its solution methodology, which needs to
11Another unfortunate feature of Walrasian mechanisms is that agents generally do not take positions that they
intend in the future to liquidate (because all trades are conditioned on all concurrent trading information). Among
other things, this produces counterfactual predictions about how liquidity is provided in ￿nancial markets: transitory
position-taking is a deep property of liquidity provision, and is important for understanding how trade quantities
(i.e., realized order ￿ow) map into price changes.
6map individual information sets into equilibrium actions, and then back to information sets. Here
we adopt a guess-and-verify method with the following 5 steps, the ￿rst and last of which sharply
distinguish our information-theoretic approach from past DGE modeling. In step 1, we make a
conjecture about the information available to agents at each point in time. This involves specifying
agents￿ information endowments as well as what they learn by observing trading outcomes. Based
on this information structure, in step 2 we guess the form of the equilibrium pricing rules for spot
rates and interest rates. In step 3, we solve for optimal consumption and portfolio allocations
(based on analytic approximation methods in Campbell and Viceira 2002). Step 4 veri￿es that
agent choices for consumption, investment, and currency holdings clear markets. In step 5, we
verify that the conjectured information structure (from step 1) can be supported by an inference
problem based on endowment information and information from trading (the latter includes both
prices and order ￿ows).
A fourth ingredient of our model below, though not an essential ingredient, is consolidation
of consumers and ￿nancial liquidity providers. Whereas new-macro DGE models focus on richer
micro-foundations on the economy￿s supply side, hence their consolidation of consumers with pro-
ducers, our focus is instead on richer micro-foundations in the area of ￿nancial price determination.
This consolidation serves three main purposes. First, it consolidates budget constraints across the
two sets of activities, which simpli￿es the analytics. Second, it ensures that messy incentive mis-
alignments do not arise (e.g., there are no agency problems). Third, it ensures that the preferences
of liquidity providers are in no sense special, as is often the case in partial-equilibrium microstruc-
ture modeling. We recognize that for some questions it will be necessary to drop this non-essential
ingredient.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Environment
2.1.1 Preferences
The world is populated by a continuum of in￿nitely-lived agents indexed by z ∈ [0,1] who are
evenly split between the home country (i.e., for z ∈ [0,1/2)) and foreign country (z ∈ [1/2,1]).
For concreteness, we shall refer to the home country as the US and the foreign country as the UK.




βiU(Ct+i,z, ￿ Ct+i,z) (1)
7where 0 <β<1 is the subjective discount factor, and U(.) is a concave sub-utility function, which
we specialize to log (which exhibits constant relative risk aversion, CRRA):
U( ￿ Ct,z,C t,z)=1
2 ln ￿ Ct,z + 1
2 lnCt,z.
All agents have identical preferences over the consumption of US goods Ct,z and UK goods ￿ Ct,z.
Et,z denotes expectations conditioned on agent z0s information set at time t, Ωt,z. Expectations
c o n d i t i o n e do nac o m m o nt i m et information set (i.e., Ωt ≡∩ z∈[0,1]Ωt,z)w i l lb ed e n o t e db yEt.
2.1.2 Timing
Decision-making in the model takes place at two frequencies. Consumption-savings decisions take
place at a lower frequency than ￿nancial decision-making (where the latter includes determination
of asset prices and reallocation of portfolios via trading). To implement this idea we split each
￿month￿ t into four periods (see Figure 1). Consumption-savings decisions are made ￿monthly,￿
while ￿nancial decisions are made periodically within the month. As will become clear, the use of
the term ￿month￿ is nothing more than a convenient label: the economic intuition developed by
the model is exactly the same if we replaced ￿month￿ t by some other consumption-relevant period.
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Figure 1: Model Timing
Period 1 (Quoting): Agents begin the month with holdings in three assets: dollar deposits, B1
t,z,
pound sterling deposits ￿ B1
t,z, and domestic capital (Kt,z for US agents and ￿ Kt,z for UK agents).12
Each agent then quotes a spot price S1
t,z ($/£) at which he is willing to buy or sell foreign currency
12Though agents do not hold foreign real capital, even if they did, ￿nancial markets here would still be incomplete:
the deeper source of incompleteness in our model is that dispersed information precludes a full set of state-contingent
claims. We address this more fully below in section 5.
8(£s). These quotes are observable to all agents.13
Period 2 (Trading): Each agent z chooses the amount of foreign currency, T2
t,z, he wishes to
purchase (negative values for sales) by initiating a trade with other agents. The sum of these
signed trade quantities is what we shall refer to as the period￿s order ￿ow. Trading is simultaneous,
trading with multiple partners is feasible, and trades are divided equally among agents oﬀering the
same quote. (That trades are divided equally is important: in equilibrium it will imply that all
agents receive the same incoming order-￿ow realization.) Once these transactions have taken place,














t,z∗ denotes the incoming foreign currency orders from other agents trading at z￿s quoted
price. S1
t i st h ep e r i o d - 1s p o tr a t eq u o t ea tw h i c hz purchases pounds. In equilibrium, this will
be the spot rate quoted by all agents (i.e., S1
t = S1
t,z ) for reasons we explain below. Notice that
period-3 currency holdings depend not only on the transactions initiated by z, (i.e., T2
t,z) but also
on the transactions initiated by other agents T2
t,z∗. An important assumption of our model is that
t h ec h o i c eo fT2
t,z by agent z cannot be conditioned on the incoming orders T2
t,z∗ because period-
2 trading takes place simultaneously. Consequently, though agents target their desired allocation
across dollar and pound assets, resulting allocations include a stochastic component from the arrival
of unexpected orders from others.
Period 3 (Quoting): All agents again quote a spot price and also a pair of one-month interest
rates for dollar and pound deposits.14 The spot quote, S3
t,z, is good for a purchase or sale of pounds,
while the interest rates, Rt,z and ￿ Rt,z indicate the rates at which the agent is willing to borrow
or lend one-month in dollars and pounds, respectively. As in period 1, all quotes are publicly
observable.
13It will be clear below that consumers in this model have both speculative and non-speculative motives for trading
(the non-speculative motive arising from the need to facilitate periodic consumption and investment). That these
motives are not purely speculative obviates concern about so-called "no trade" results (i.e., the theorem proposed
by Milgrom and Stokey 1982, that if I know that your only motive for trade with me is superior information, then I
would never want to trade with you at any price at which you want to trade).
14Deposit rates are not set in every period because interest is assumed to accrue at the monthly frequency only. As
a qualitative matter, abstracting from intra-month interest misses little in the context of the world￿s major currencies,
all of which are generally characterized by relatively low in￿ation and low nominal interest rates.
9P e r i o d4( T r a d i n ga n dR e a lD e c i s i o n s ) :I np e r i o d4 ,a g e n t sc h o o s eas e c o n dr o u n do ff o r e i g n
currency purchases (if there remain motives for further intra-month trade).15 They also choose their
real allocations: consumption of US and UK goods and real investment expenditures. After US
agents z have chosen their consumption of US and UK goods, Ct,z and ￿ Ct,z, their foreign currency
purchases T4






t,z − It,z + S3
t T4
t,z∗ + Ct,z∗), (2)
￿ B1
t+1,z = ￿ Rt( ￿ B3
t,z + T4
t,z − ￿ Ct,z − T4
t,z∗) (3)
where Rt and ￿ Rt are the dollar and pound interest rates (gross) that are quoted by all agents in
period 3 of month t (in equilibrium, Rt,z = Rt and ￿ Rt,z = ￿ Rt for all z, as shown below). As in
period 2 trading, actual deposit holdings following period-4 trading also depend on the actions of
other agents. In particular, incoming orders for foreign currency T4
t,z∗ and incoming orders for US
goods Ct,z∗ aﬀect the deposit levels in the ￿rst period of the following month. Notice, for example,
that B1
t+1,z is augmented by Ct,z∗: these are deposits received in exchange for exports of US goods.









t+1,z = ￿ Rt( ￿ B3
t,z + T4
t,z − ￿ It,z − T4
t,z∗ + ￿ Ct,z∗) (5)
Finally, we turn to the dynamics of the capital stocks. The production of US and UK goods at
the start of month t +1 , Yt+1,z and ￿ Yt+1,z,i sg i v e nb y :
Yt+1,z = At+1 (Kt,z − Ct,z − Ct,z∗ + It,z),
￿ Yt+1,z = ￿ At+1( ￿ Kt,z − ￿ Ct,z − ￿ Ct,z∗ + ￿ It,z),
where At+1 and ￿ At+1 are shocks to US and UK productivity. The capital stock at the end of period
4 trading is denoted by the term in parenthesis in each equation. These production functions lead
to the following capital accumulation equations:
Kt+1,z = Rk
t+1 (Kt,z − Ct,z − Ct,z∗ + It,z), (6)
￿ Kt+1,z = ￿ Rk
t+1
‡
￿ Kt,z − ￿ Ct,z − ￿ Ct,z∗ + ￿ It,z
·
, (7)
15That motives for further currency trade within the month will indeed remain is one of the model￿s important
properties. It addresses the question of why agents would want to trade at such high frequencies.
10where Rk
t+1 ≡ 1+At+1, and ￿ Rk
t+1 =1+￿ At+1 denote the one month returns on US and UK capital.
(Depreciation is zero in both countries.) Equation (6) shows how US consumers￿ holdings of capital
evolve, while the dynamics of UK consumers￿ holdings follow (7).
2.1.3 Productivity and the Information Structure
Our model becomes explicitly "international" with the speci￿cation of relative productivity, the
driving force behind the exchange rate. The key feature that diﬀerentiates US from UK agents is
that each agent type is better informed about the productivity of home ￿rms than foreign ￿rms.
(This could result, for example, through direct observation of the productivity realization for one￿s
own ￿rm.) As a result, agents in diﬀerent countries do not share the same expectation about
current and future returns to real capital. Below we examine how this dispersed information is
impounded in exchange rates and interest rates via trading. Our focus is thus on the process of
information transmission, not so much on the speci￿c type of underlying information. The analysis
can be extended to include dispersed information about multiple underlying information types.
The exogenous productivity processes are expressed here in terms of log returns on real capital.
Though we specify these separately for the US and UK, as we shall see, only relative productivity
will matter for exchange rate determination:
lnRk
t ≡ rk
t = r + ut + et + θ(et−1 − ￿ et−1), (8a)
ln ￿ Rk
t ≡ ￿ rk
t = r +￿ ut +￿ et + θ(￿ et−1 − et−1). (8b)
We assume that the ut, ￿ ut,e t,a n d￿ et are normally distributed mean zero shocks. The ut and ￿ ut
shocks have a common variance σ2
u and the et and ￿ et shocks have a common variance σ2
e. We allow
for the possibility of non-zero covariance between the ut and ￿ ut shocks, which we denote ρσ2
u,b u t
for tractability we assume that the et and ￿ et shocks are independently distributed.
Our speci￿cation for log capital returns includes two random components beyond the constant
r: a transitory component ut (￿ ut) and a persistent component et (￿ et). The transitory component
ut (￿ ut)i sao n e - m o n t he ﬀect on US (UK) returns with cross-country correlation ρ. Unlike ut (￿ ut),
the random variable et (￿ et) is contemporaneously independent across countries, but gives rise to an
intertemporal impact that depends on this component￿s cross-country diﬀerential from the previous
period. It should be clear from these two productivity processes that the diﬀerential, i.e., rk
t − ￿ rk
t ,
follows a simple MA(1) process. This greatly facilitates analysis of the diﬀerential as a driving
force (richer processes for this diﬀerential get technically diﬃcult quickly). Though not intended as
precise empirical representations, we consider it uncontroversial that capital returns should include
both transitory and persistent components.
For the analysis below, we examine information structures in which each month t all US agents
11o b s e r v ei np e r i o d1t h e i rh o m es h o c k s{ut,e t}, whereas all UK agents observe their home shocks
{￿ ut, ￿ et}.16 Dispersed information thus exists inter-nationally but not intra-nationally. (One can
think of intra-national information as having been aggregated "in the background"; treating these
respective information sets as signals by adding idiosyncratic noise is a straightforward extension.)
For our purposes here, the speci￿cations in (8) highlight the theoretical consequences of dispersed
information in the simplest possible way.
2.2 Decision-Making
Agents make two types of decisions: consumption-savings decisions and ￿nancial pricing (quoting)
decisions. The former are familiar from standard macro models, but the latter are new. By quoting
spot prices and interest rates at which they stand ready to trade, agents are taking on the liquidity-
providing role of ￿nancial intermediaries. Speci￿cally, the quote problem facing agents in periods 1
and 3 is identical to that facing a marketmaker in a simultaneous trading model (see, for example,
Lyons 1997, Rime 2001, Evans and Lyons 2002a). We therefore draw on this literature to determine
how quotes are set.
Equilibrium quotes are derived as a Nash equilibrium with the following two properties: (i) they
are consistent with market clearing, and (ii) they are a function of public information only. Though
the latter property is not necessary for the information transmission role of transaction ￿ows, it
is important for this role, so let us address it more fully. With this property, the information in
unanticipated ￿ow can only be impounded into price after it is realized and publicly observed.
This lies at the opposite pole of the information assumptions underlying Walrasian mechanisms
(Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 being an example) in which the market price at a given time im-
pounds information in every trade occurring at that time. The Walrasian mechanism is akin to
assuming that all trades are conditioned on one another. This is obviously counter-factual in most
markets, and certainly so in FX.17 As noted in the previous section, what is really necessary for
t h et r a n s m i s s i o nr o l eo ft r a n s a c t i o n￿ow is that market prices do not yet impound all information
in executed transactions. That equilibrium quotes are conditioned only on public information in
our model insures this, and goes a bit further to simplify the analytics. This aspect of the model
can be viewed as taking seriously the information constraints that price-setters actually face.
We should stress, though, that quotes being conditioned only on public information is not an
16This is not the same as assuming two representative consumers: two consumers would interact strategically (a
rather implausible notion here), whereas in our continuum consumers are perfectly competitive.
17Even if the FX market were organized as a centralized auction with full transparency, this would not be not
suﬀcient for Walrasian-type aggregation: it would also have to be true that in equilibrium all agents would actually
choose to trade simultaneously (so that each could condition on the price eﬀects of others￿ trades). In any case, actual
FX markets are not centralized auctions, but rather decentralized dealer markets with trade transparency that is is
relatively low.
12assumption, but a result. Put diﬀerently, we make other assumptions that are suﬃcient for this
outcome (drawing from the simultaneous-trade references above). Those assumptions are (1) that
actions within any given quoting or trading period are simultaneous, (2) that quotes are a single
price good for any size, and (3) that trading with multiple marketmakers is feasible.18 The resulting




t,w h e r e
S
j
t is a function of public information Ω
j
t (determined below). Similarly, the period-3 interest rate
quotes are given by Rt,z = Rt and ￿ Rt,z = ￿ Rt,w h e r eRt and ￿ Rt are functions of Ω3
t.T ou n d e r s t a n d
why these quotes represent a Nash equilibrium, consider a marketmaker who is pondering whether
to depart from this public-information price by quoting a weighted average of public information
and his own individual information. Any price that deviates from other prices would attract pure
arbitrage trade ￿ows, and therefore could not possibly represent an equilibrium. Instead, it is
optimal for marketmakers to quote the same price as others (which means the price is necessarily
conditioned on public information), and then exploit their individual information by initiating
trades at other marketmakers￿ prices. (In some models, marketmakers can only establish desired
positions by setting price to attract incoming trades, which is not the case here since they always
have the option of initiating outgoing trades.)
Next we turn to the consumption and portfolio choices made in periods 2 and 4. Let W
j
t,z
denote the wealth of individual z at the beginning of period j in month t. This comprises the value











t,z + Kt,z + S3
t ￿ Kt,z
Notice that wealth is valued in dollars using the equilibrium spot rate quoted in the period before
trading takes place.19
In period 2 agents initiate transactions (i.e., choose T2
t,z) to allocate wealth optimally between
dollar and pound assets. Because trading takes place simultaneously, however, the choice of T2
t,z
cannot be conditioned on the orders they simultaneously receive from others, T2
t,z∗.O fc o u r s e ,i n
choosing T2
t,z agents do their best to forecast T2
t,z∗, but they cannot condition on its realization. We
denote this forecast of the incoming order as E2
t,zT2
t,z∗.( H e r e a f t e rw eu s eE
j
t,z to denote expectations
conditioned on information available to individual z at the beginning of period j in month t.)
18The assumption of no spreads is not necessary, though it greatly facilitates the analytics. Speci￿cally, each
trader-consumer￿s quote could be a schedule of prices, one for each incoming order quantity from minus in￿nity to
plus in￿nity, as long as that schedule is conditioned only on the incoming order, as opposed to the realization of all
other orders in the market (i.e., the quoting trader would in this way be able to protect against adverse selection in
the single incoming trade).
19No single agent can hold both Kt,z and ˆ Kt,z since agents hold domestic real capital only; thus, depending on





t,z) denote the value functions for agent z at the beginning of periods 2
and 4. T2






















































T h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l eλt,z is key. It identi￿es the target fraction of wealth agents wish to hold in




t,z are determined from the optimal choice of λt,z given E2
t,zT2
t,z∗, ￿ B1
t,z+ ￿ Yt,z+ ￿ Kt,z,
and W2
t,z.) H3
t,z identi￿es the within-month return on wealth (i.e., between periods 1 and 3). This
depends on the rate of appreciation in the pound and the actual faction of wealth held in foreign
deposits at the end of period-2 trading. The latter term is λt,z − ξt,z,w h e r eξt,z represents the
position-eﬀect of unexpected incoming pound orders from other agents (a shock). This means that
the return on wealth, H3
t,z, is subject to two sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about the future
spot rate S3
t , and uncertainty about order ￿ow in the form of trades initiated by other agents T2
t,z∗.
In period 4, agents choose consumption of US and UK goods, foreign currency orders, and
investment expenditures. Let αt,z and γt,z denote the desired fractions of wealth held in pounds
and domestic capital respectively:
αt,z ≡
S3
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14The period-4 problem can now be written as:
J4
z(W4
t,z)= m a x
{Ct,z, ˆ Ct,z,αt,z,γt,z}
n
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t+1 ≡ 1+At+1 and ￿ Rk
t+1 ≡ 1+ ￿ At+1.
H1
t+1,z is the excess return on wealth (measured relative to the dollar one-month interest rate
Rt). As above, realized returns depend on the actual faction of wealth held in pounds αt,z −





t,z represents the eﬀects of unexpected currency orders
that arise from period-4 trading. Monthly returns also depend on the fraction of wealth held in







identi￿es the eﬀects of unexpected demand for US goods (i.e. US exports).20 In the UK case, the
fraction is γt,z − ￿ ζt,z, where ￿ ζt,z ≡
‡




t,z. Monthly returns are therefore subject
to four sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about future spot rates (i.e., S1
t+1,w h i c ha ﬀects deposit
returns); uncertainty about future productivity (which aﬀects real capital returns); uncertainty
about incoming currency orders; and uncertainty about export demand.
The ￿rst-order conditions governing consumption and portfolio choice (i.e., Ct,z, ￿ Ct,z,λ t,z,α t,z)
take the same form for both US and UK agents:




































t Rt − 1
·i
, (16)
where Vt,z ≡ dJ4
z(W4
t,z)/dW4
t,z is the marginal utility of wealth. The ￿rst-order conditions governing
20When superior information about home-country income is not symmetrized by month￿s end, one manifestation
of the residual uncertainty is a shock to export demand.
15real investment (i.e. γt,z) diﬀe rb e t w e e nU Sa n dU Ka g e n t sa n da r eg i v e nb y :


























To further characterize the form of optimal consumption, portfolio and investment decisions,










In a standard macro model where agents provide no liquidity provision, equations (15) - (19)
together imply that Vt,z = Uc( ￿ Ct,z,C t,z). The ￿rst-order conditions can then be rewritten in familiar
form using the marginal rate of substitution. This is not generally the case in our model. As we
shall show, the marginal utility of wealth Vt,z can diverge from the marginal utility of consumption
because unexpected currency and export orders aﬀect portfolio returns.
2.3 Market Clearing
Market clearing in the currency market requires that the dollar value of pound orders initiated









for j = {2,4}.
We assume that dollar and pound deposits are in zero net supply so that aggregate deposit












t,zdz =0 . (21)
Combining these conditions with the budget constraints for dollar and pound deposits implies that
both US and UK real investment expenditures It,z and ￿ It,z must equal zero if the deposit and
goods markets are to clear.21 The reason is that both currency and goods market transactions only
aﬀect the distribution of deposits, not their aggregate level. This means that It,z and ￿ It,z must be
21Though this feature of the model appears rather special, it is not driving our results.
16￿nanced by an increase aggregate deposit holdings, an implication that is inconsistent with market
clearing. As a consequence, the capital available for production after period-4 trading is complete
is Kt,z −
R
Ct,zdz in the US and ￿ Kt,z −
R ￿ Ct,zdz in the UK. Each capital stock is augmented by
production that takes place between month t and t+1 , so that the stock of US and UK capital in

















There equations summarize the implications of market clearing for the dynamics of capital.
3 Solving for Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is described by: (i) a set of quote functions that clear markets given the
consumption, investment, and portfolio choices of agents; and (ii) a set of consumption, investment,
and portfolio rules that maximize expected utility given spot rates, interest rates, and exogenous
productivity. In this section we describe how the equilibrium is constructed.
3.1 Solution Method
We solve for equilibrium using a guess-and-verify method. This includes the following ￿ve steps,
the ￿rst and last of which distinguish our information approach quite sharply from other DGE
macro modeling:
1. Information Conjecture: We make a conjecture about information available to agents at each
point in time. This involves specifying what information agents receive directly and what
they learn by observing trading.
2. Quote Decisions: Based on this information structure, we then guess the form of equilibrium
quote functions for spot rates and interest rates (periods 1 and 3).
3. Allocation Decisions: We use log linearized ￿rst-order conditions and budget constraint to
approximate agents￿ optimal consumption, investment, and currency choices given the spot
and interest rates from step 2.
4. Market Clearing: We check that agent choices for consumption, investment, and currency
holdings clear markets.
175. Information Conjecture Veri￿ed: We verify that the conjectured information structure (from
step 1) can be supported by an inference problem based on exogenous information available
to each agent, and their observations of quotes and trading activity.
3.2 Log Approximations
Step 3 of our solution method requires the use of log approximations. In particular, we need log
approximations for the following: (1) within-month returns, (2) across-month returns, (3) budget
constraints, (4) ￿rst-order conditions, and (5) capital-stock dynamics.22 For within-month returns,
we use the de￿nition of the period-3 return H3
t,z from the previous section, which yields the log
approximation:
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where lowercase letters denote natural logs. (Thus, hx
t,z denotes the log excess return on the wealth




t,z[.] denote the variance and covariance
conditioned on agent z0s information at the start of period j in month t.T h i s a p p r o x i m a t i o n i s
similar to those adopted by Campbell and Viceira (2002) and is based on a second-order approxi-
mation that holds exactly in continuous time when the change in spot rates and unexpected order
￿ow follow Wiener processes.
Monthly returns are approximated in a similar fashion. Speci￿cally, for US agents (i.e. z<1/2)
we use:
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and for UK agents (z ≥ 1/2):
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Notice that unexpected period-4 order ￿ows ςt,z and export demand ζt,z aﬀect returns through the
last covariance terms shown in each equation. These terms represent the eﬀects of non-diversi￿able
22Complete derivations are contained in the appendix, section 4.
18risk that arise from liquidity provision. Unexpected currency orders and export orders during
period 2 and 4 trading represent a source of risk that agents cannot fully hedge.
The monthly budget constraint is approximated by combining the two periodic budget con-
straints in (10) and (12):
∆w4
t+1,z ∼ = rt + h3













δt,z ≡ ct,z − w4
t,z − ln(µ/2)
is the log consumption wealth ratio. µ is a positive constant equal to the steady-state value of
2Ct,z/W4
t,z.
A fascinating feature of the model is that transmission of price-relevant information via trading
can push a wedge between the marginal utilities of wealth and consumption. To see this, we combine
the log linearized versions of equations (13) - (19) and our assumption of log utility to obtain the
log marginal utility of wealth vt,z as:
vt,z = −ct,z − φt,z, (28)

























for z ≥ 1/2 (UK agents). In the absence
of unexpected period-4 currency orders and export demand, the shocks ςt,z, ζt,z and ￿ ζt,z are zero
and the (log) marginal utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of consumption. When these
shocks are present and correlated with the future spot rate, and/or returns on capital, the return
on wealth is exposed to these sources of systematic risk that may push up or down the log return
o nw e a l t ha c c o r d i n gt ot h es i g no ft h ec o v a r i a n c et e r m s .A sw es h a l ls e e ,t h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e n






, will diﬀer from zero when period-4
currency trading provides information relevant to the setting of future spot rates.
Approximations to the model￿s ￿rst-order conditions are derived by substituting for vt,z (=lnVt,z)








































ct,z :l n β + rt = E4
t,z
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￿ ct,z : ct,z = s3
t +￿ ct,z, (32)
















































Notice that the presence of liquidity provision in the model only aﬀects the ￿rst-order conditions
for agent behavior through the φt,z terms. When combined with the linearized budget constraint,
these equations provide analytic approximations for the solution to the optimizations problems
facing agents at the beginning of periods 2 and 4 (i.e., expressions for the two portfolio shares λt,z
and αt,z, real investment γt,z, and consumptions ct,z and ￿ ct,z) given the rk
t and ￿ rk
t processes, and
the equilibrium dynamics of spot exchange rates and interest rates (determined below).
Capital stock dynamics are approximated from the market-clearing conditions in (22) and (23):
kt+1 − kt ∼ = rk











￿ kt+1 − ￿ kt ∼ = ￿ rk











In deriving these equations for capital dynamics, we have assumed that deposit holdings always
represent a small fraction of agent wealth. This condition is met trivially in the steady state because
b o t hU Sa n dU Ka g e n t sh o l da l lt h e i rw e a l t hi nt h ef o r mo fd o m e s t i cc a p i t a l . T h ea c c u r a c yo f
these approximations deteriorates when away from the steady state if agents accumulate substantial
￿nancial assets/liabilities relative to their capital holdings.
4 Exchange Rate Dynamics
This section examines equilibrium exchange rate dynamics. In particular, we focus on how dispersed
information concerning productivity becomes embedded in spot rates. Recall that the processes for
(log) capital returns the US and UK, respectively, follow:
rk
t = r + ut + et + θ(et−1 − ￿ et−1),
￿ rk
t = r +￿ ut +￿ et + θ(￿ et−1 − et−1),
w h e r ew ea l l o wt h et r a n s i t o r yc o m p o n e n t sut and ￿ ut have correlation ρ, but the persistent com-
ponents et and ￿ et are independent across countries (for tractability). We assume that information
about the return on capital arrives as follows:
201. US agents all observe the realization of their home shocks {ut,e t} in period 1 of month t,
2. UK agents all observe the realizations of their home shocks (￿ ut,￿ et) in period 1 of month t,
and
3. All agents in both countries observe the realized values of log capital returns in month t, rk
t
and ￿ rk
t , when they are publicly announced in period 1 of the following month t+1.23
The equilibrium exchange rate process implied by this information structure is presented in the
form of a series of propositions. These propositions clarify the model￿s essential features and provide
insights into the speci￿c role of information revelation. Formal derivations of the propositions are
in the appendix. We begin by characterizing the determination of spot prices in periods 1 and 3 of
each month:








where the operator ∇ denotes the diﬀerence between US and UK values (e.g., ∇kt = kt − ￿ kt).
Proposition 1 ties the period-1 and period-3 spot rates to the expected diﬀerence between
the log US and UK capital stocks, where expectations are conditioned on common information,
Ω
j
t = {1,3}. To develop intuition for this result, we ￿rst note that markets are incomplete in our
model, so that the spot rate is not determined by the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption
of US versus UK goods.24 Rather, the spot rate is tied down by the international distribution of
wealth. This can be seen by combining the de￿nitions of the realized capital shares γt,z − ζt,z (see
the de￿nition of H1
















23This third assumption does not imply that the exchange rate is re-established at its full-information value in
period 1 of every month, for two reasons: (1) there are new, unobserved shocks to productivity that arrive at the
same time and (2) real decisions in period 4 of the previous month are based on expectations at that time, and errors
in these expectations have eﬀects on real allocations that persist (with persistent eﬀects on exchange rates, as clari￿ed
below).
24The nature of market incompleteness is somewhat novel in this model, so we discuss it in some detail in section
5.
21The ratio of US to UK wealth is proportional to the ratio of US to UK capital, with the propor-
tionality factor that depends on the ratio of realized capital shares. In equilibrium, changes in the
wealth ratio are highly correlated with changes in the capital ratio because allocation choices (i.e.,
γt,z) are determined by expected excess returns that are comparatively stable. This means that
any equilibrium restrictions on the distribution of wealth will have their counterpart on the distri-
bution of capital. One such restriction is that the wealth of each consumer remains positive (i.e.,
Wi
t,z > 0 for i = {2,4}), or equivalently that log wealth remains bounded. In equilibrium, order
￿ows aggregate dispersed information about productivity because consumers have an incentive to
trade based on their individual information. This process of social learning is a crucial element in
the equilibrium (see Propositions 3 and 4 below), but it breaks down if the wealth of either US or
UK consumers falls to zero. (For example, if W2
t,US =0 , then there is no period-2 order ￿ow that
can convey dispersed information about US productivity shocks, ut and et.) It is this bound on log

















Equation (40) identi￿e st h eu n i q u ev a l u ef o rt h es p o tr a t et h a tp l a c e sKt/S3
t ￿ Kt on an expected
future path consistent with the equilibrium bound on log wealth. To see why this is so, consider what
w o u l dh a p p e ni ft h ee x p e c t e dt +1return on US capital rose relative to the return on UK capital,
with no change in current or future spot rates. This change in returns would raise the expected
r a t i oo fU St oU Kc a p i t a li nt+1.I tw o u l da l s ol o w e rWt+1,UK/Kt+1 and raise Wt+1,US/S3
t+1 ￿ Kt+1,
thereby reducing US exports and raising UK exports (relative to domestic capital). These wealth
eﬀects induce a self-perpetuating cycle of higher growth in US capital and lower growth in UK
capital from t+1onwards. And, as a result, Kt/S3
t ￿ Kt would rise without bound and W4
t,UK would
be driven to zero. This outcome can be avoided if the current spot rate is raised to oﬀset the eﬀects
of higher returns on the distribution of capital in t +1 . The present value term in equation (40)
shows the extent to which the current spot rate must be raised to oﬀset the eﬀects of future return
diﬀerentials, such that the international distribution of log capital and wealth remain bounded.
The quote equations of Proposition 1 follow in a straightforward manner from (40). The equi-
librium dynamics of spot rates insure that expected future returns on US and UK capital are equal
(when expressed in terms of a common currency). Under these circumstances, the present value
term disappears from (40), leaving s3
t = E3
t∇kt as shown in equation (39). Period-1 spot rate quotes
are set so that expected intra-month returns are equal.25 Since no intra-month interest is paid on
25This property of the equilibrium arises from the absence of hedging terms in the period-2 portfolio choices (see
appendix for further details).




t∇kt as in equation (38).
Proposition 1 enables us to identify the diﬀerent factors that contribute to the dynamics of spot


































These equations show how changing expectations about the distribution of capital and the return
on capital contribute to spot rate dynamics. Speci￿cally, equation (41) shows that the revision
in spot rate quotes between periods t-1:3 and t:1 has two components. (Hereafter, we use the
shorthand t:x to denote period x in month t.) The ￿rst is the common knowledge expectation of




t − ￿ rk
t ]. The second component is proportional to
the current estimate (conditional on Ω1
t) of the last month￿s error in estimating the distribution
of capital, ∇kt−1 − E3
t−1∇kt−1. T h es p o tr a t ec h a n g eb e t w e e nt : 1 and t:3 s h o w ni n( 4 2 )i sa l s o







t conveys what agents learn about
capital returns during the current month. The second term identi￿es what they learned during the
current month about last month￿s error in estimating the distribution of capital.
Equations (41) and (42) make it clear that exchange rate dynamics are driven by information
￿ows. In particular, the evolution of common-knowledge information through time is key to under-
standing the contribution of the various components of spot-rate changes. We shall now study this
e v o l u t i o ni nd e t a i l .
Proposition 2 Immediate revelation of new information about the month-t state of the econ-
o m yo c c u r so n l yw h e nρ = −1.
Recall that US (UK) agents learn the values of et and ut (￿ et and ￿ ut) at the start of period 1
in month t. Although all four shocks contribute to the current diﬀerence in capital returns, ∇rk
t ,
they cannot aﬀect the spot rate until they become common knowledge. In the special case where
ρ = −1, both ut and ￿ ut are common knowledge, and thereby aﬀect period-1 quotes via E1
t∇rk
t in
(41). Thus, some dispersed information about the current state of the economy is immediately
re￿ected in the spot rate. When ρ>−1, none of the dispersed information regarding current
returns is immediately common knowledge, so the period-1 spot rate does not re￿ect any new
information about the current state of the economy (despite the information existing in dispersed
form).
23Proposition 3 shows the extent to which dispersed information is learned via period-2 trading.




t,zdz denote aggregate order ￿ow for pounds in period-2 trading.
In equilibrium, aggregate order ￿ow augments the common-knowledge information set between the







. In the special case where ρ = −1,∇et ∈ Ω3
t. For the

















t−1 i st h es c a l e di n n o v a t i o nt op e r i o d - 2o r d e r￿ow (relative to
Ω2
t) that depends on all four returns shocks:
ξt ∼ = ξe∇et + ξu∇ut. (44)











= πe∇et + πu∇ut, (45)
where πe =( 1− ψξe) 6=0and πu =( 1− ψξu) 6=0 .
This proposition shows the pace at which period-2 trading aggregates dispersed information.
(Coeﬃcient values are in the appendix.) Period-2 order ￿ow is informative because s3
t − s1
t is
forecastable based on agents￿ individual information, Ω2
t,z. Hence, each agent has an incentive to
trade, and in so doing some of their individual information is revealed to others via order ￿ow.
When ρ = −1, the innovation in order ￿ow is a function of et and ￿ et. This means that each
agent can infer the value of ∇et from incoming order ￿ow and their individual information. Under
these circumstances, dispersed information concerning et and ￿ et becomes common knowledge after
a single trading period. The key to this result is that the value of et or ￿ et represents the sole source
of individual information that motivates trade. In particular, ut and ￿ ut play no role because they
are common knowledge and their implications are fully re￿e c t e di nt h ep e r i o d - 1s p o tr a t e ,s1
t. When
ρ>−1, by contrast, the values of et and ut (￿ et and ￿ ut) are both sources of superior information to
US (UK) agents because the values of ut and ￿ ut are not re￿ected in s1
t. This means that order ￿ow
innovations contain information on all four shocks, as approximated by (44). As a consequence, it
is not generally possible for any agent to precisely infer the values of ∇et +∇ut by combining their
individual information with their observation of period-2 order ￿ow.26 Consequently, aggregation
26The exception occurs when ρ =0 . In this case, the trades of US (UK) consumers are a function of et+ut (ˆ et+ˆ ut),
24of dispersed information at the end of period-2 trading is incomplete.















This equation shows that order ￿ow aggregates information from: (i) the portfolio allocation deci-
sions of US and UK consumers λz,t, (ii) the distribution of wealth Wt,z, (iii) the outstanding UK
capital stock ￿ Kt, and (iv) expectations of incoming order ￿ow E2
t,zT2
t,z∗. This means that order ￿ow
re￿ects both individual information about the current state and many other variables that aﬀect
the distribution of wealth, capital stock and so on. In general, these additional variables are not
common-knowledge. Rather, they represent a source of noise that makes precise inferences about
the current state from observations of order ￿ow impossible. This source of informational ineﬃ-
ciency is likely to occur in any model that combines dispersed information with constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA): because CRRA asset demands depend on wealth, less-than-full information
about the distribution of wealth creates noise, more diﬃcult signal extraction, and informational
ineﬃciency.
Next we turn to period-4 trading.
Proposition 4 After period-4 trading, information aggregation is complete. In particular,
the components of returns ut, ￿ ut,e t, and ￿ et are all common knowledge:











t,zdz denotes aggregate order ￿ow for pounds in period-4 trading.
When ρ>−1, period-3 spot rates cannot fully re￿ect all information relevant to the state of the
economy. This means that agents still have individual information that is relevant for forecasting
returns between t:4 and t+1:1, and hence have an incentive to trade in period 4. Order ￿ow
in period 4 will therefore constitute a second signal on the underlying distribution of individual
information. This signal contains incremental information suﬃcient to reveal fully the values of ￿ ut,
and ￿ et to US consumers, and the values of ut and et to UK consumers. As a result, the values of
ut, ￿ ut,e t, and ￿ et become common knowledge by the end of period-4 trading.
Two features of our model lie behind the speed of information aggregation. First, each consumer
has only to learn about a limited amount of information, namely, the values of two foreign shocks.
Second, our model makes trading very transparent because in equilibrium, incoming orders are
equally divided among all consumers. This means that the order ￿o wr e c e i v e db ye a c hc o n s u m e r
so observation of ξt combined with private information could fully reveal the value of ∇et + ∇ut to all consumers.
25is completely representative of the market as a whole. This high level of transparency insures that
incoming orders are only a function of ut, ￿ ut,e t, and ￿ et in each period. Consequently, consumers
can precisely infer the values of the two foreign shocks from incoming orders in periods 2 and 4.
Information would not aggregate so quickly with less transparency. For example, suppose incoming
orders were randomly assigned to consumers quoting the same price, so that the incoming order
received by each consumer contains an idiosyncratic component. This idiosyncratic component
would add noise to the signals provided by incoming orders in periods 2 and 4. As a consequence,
incoming orders would no longer be jointly suﬃcient to reveal the values of the foreign shocks to all
consumers. Thus, if trading were less transparent, information aggregation at the end of period-4
would still be incomplete.
We may summarize the implications of Propositions 2 through 4 as follows. For the special case



















This information structure implies that ∇kt−1 = E3
t−1∇kt−1, E1
t∇rk







t = ∇et, so equations (41) and (42) become:
s1
t − s3
t−1 =2 θ∇et−1 + ∇ut, (46a)
s3
t − s1
t = ∇et. (46b)
The exchange rate dynamics described by these equations re￿ect the rapid pace of information
aggregation. With perfectly correlated productivity shocks ut and ￿ ut, seeing one means seeing the
other, so at the time of their realization both are in the common-knowledge information set (i.e., at
t:1). Consequently, ut and ￿ ut have an immediate, one-to-one eﬀect on the period-1 spot rate. Given
this, all consumers can make precise inferences about the remaining uncertainty (the values of et
and ￿ et) from their observation of period-2 order ￿ow. The period-3 price is perfectly revealing.



















This information structure implies that ∇kt−1 = E3










t = ψξt, so equations (41) and (42) become:
s1
t − s3





(πe∇et−1 + πu∇ut−1), (47)
s3
t − s1
t = ψξt. (48)
T h ee x c h a n g er a t ed y n a m i c sd e s c r i b e dh e r er e ￿ect the slower speed of information aggregation.
Equation (47) shows that ut and ￿ ut have no immediate impact on the spot rate because they are
not common knowledge at the time of their realization. Instead, dispersed information on ∇ut and
∇et becomes gradually embedded in spot rates via the order ￿ows generated in periods 2 and 4.
Embedding via period-2 order ￿o wi ss h o w ni n( 4 8 ) .T h es e c o n dt e r mi n( 4 7 )s h o w st h ee m b e d d i n g
eﬀect of period-4 order ￿ow.
The speed of information aggregation also has implications for real allocation decisions. When
ρ>−1, consumers make real consumption and investment decisions at the start of period 4 before
the complete state of the economy is known. This means that real allocations will be distorted by
(rational) expectation errors. In Propositions 5 and 6 below we examine the implications of these
distortions for the dynamics of fundamentals and the volatility of exchange rates.
Proposition 5 Expectational errors are embedded in fundamentals via the relation:












Proposition 5 shows that the monthly change in the realized distribution of capital includes
two components: the diﬀerence in capital returns ∇rk
t+1, and residual uncertainty after period-2





. When ρ = −1, there is common
knowledge about the full state of the economy by period 3 and s3
t = ∇kt. Accordingly, we refer to
∇kt as identifying common-knowledge fundamentals. In this special case, ∇kt ∈ Ω3
t, so changes in
fundamentals are driven solely by the diﬀerence in capital returns. In the general case with ρ>−1,
both components contribute to the dynamics of fundamentals. In particular, Proposition 3 shows





= πe∇et + πu∇ut, so







Thus, residual uncertainty about the distribution of capital becomes embedded in the dynamics of







, so residual uncertainty creates a gap between the month t spot rate,
27s3
t and its fundamental level, ∇kt, that aﬀects the international distribution of wealth. This, in
turn, aﬀe c t se x p o r t si nb o t ht h eU Sa n dU K ,t h e r e b yi n ￿uencing the rate of capital accumulation
in both countries between month t and t +1 . Thus, past exchange rates aﬀect the current level
of fundamentals. Notice, too, that the eﬀects of residual uncertainty are not transitory. Even
though the value of past fundamentals become common knowledge with just a one-month lag,
eﬀects on the level of fundamentals persist inde￿nitely: Although consumers learn about their
￿consumption mistakes￿ once information aggregation is complete, their optimal response does not
involve immediate reversal of those mistakes.27
Proposition 6 When ρ = −1, the volatility of the monthly depreciation rate is determined by

















, the monthly depreciation rate displays volatility in excess












This proposition links the speed of information aggregation to excess volatility. Recall that
when ρ>−1, consumers make real consumption and investment decisions at the start of period
4 before the complete state of the economy is known. Proposition 5 shows how this aﬀects the
dynamics of fundamentals via the presence of expectations errors. These errors can also be the
















Here we see that monthly changes in the exchange rate depend on current shocks, via E3
t+1∇rk
t+1,


























































27This embedding eﬀect on consumption and real capital provides a natural link to the current account dynamics












< 0 (from the de￿nition of a variance), so the ￿rst term on the
right suggests that the lack of common knowledge should reduce volatility. (This corresponds to
the mistaken intuition that less information here can only translate into less price adjustment, and
therefore less volatility.) But, as the equation shows, this argument overlooks the eﬀects of agents￿
learning about past states of the economy. In our model, E3
























Clearly the ￿rst term is positive because it is proportional to the variance of forecast errors for
fundamentals. The second term will also be positive when agents use information learned about
past fundamentals to estimate capital￿s current return. The size of these terms depends on how
much is learnt from period-2 trading. When order ￿ow is relatively uninformative, the πe and πu
coeﬃcients will be larger and the eﬀects of learning will contribute more to the volatility of spot
rates. Proposition 6 identi￿es a suﬃcient condition for excess volatility (i.e., πu > ﬂ πu), where the
learning eﬀects dominate.
5 Additional Implications
In this section, we study four additional aspects of our model: (1) exchange rate responses to public
announcements, (2) the information content of order ￿o w sv e r s u s" p o r t f o l i o "￿ows, (3) trading
volume, and (4) the role of incomplete markets. We include the ￿rst of these because it remains a
puzzle why the large empirical literature on public macro announcements ￿nds so little exchange
rate impact. Our model provides a plausible direction for resolution. We include the second of these
because our model clari￿es why these two ￿ow concepts￿order ￿o w sv e r s u sp o r t f o l i o￿ows￿diﬀer
signi￿cantly in terms of information content. (Both are used in empirical work, with little attention
to their theoretical diﬀerences.) For the third, trading volume, it remains a puzzle why the volume
of foreign exchange transactions relative to international real trade is so large, so it is natural to
ask whether the presence of dispersed information casts new light. Lastly, we consider the role
in the model of incomplete markets and how the aggregation of information could be aﬀected by
introducing additional ￿nancial assets.
5.1 Announcements
Our model brings new perspective to the link between exchange rates and public macro announce-
ments. Recall that we speci￿ed the model with a public announcement at the start of each month
that conveys the realized value of the previous months￿ fundamental (the previous month￿s realized
29capital returns). In equilibrium, this announcement comes late enough that it has no impact on
spot rates: it is simply an oﬃcial aggregation of information that has already been fully aggregated
via trading by the market.
This feature of our model highlights the deep link between the speed of information aggregation
and the impact of public announcements. For announcements to have exchange rate impact, they
must either arrive more promptly (i.e., before aggregation by the market is complete), or one must
add sources of inference complexity to the model such that information revealed in period-4 actions
is no longer suﬃcient to reveal past fundamentals fully. We formalize the ￿rst of these possibilities
with the following proposition:
Proposition 7 When ρ>−1, public announcements concerning the values of rk
t and ￿ rk
t will
only aﬀect exchange rates if the announcements are made before period 4 in month t.
When the transitory capital-return shocks ut and ￿ ut have correlation greater than -1, the state of
fundamentals is not fully revealed until agents observe actions from period 4. Any announcement
of realized capital returns prior to that time would itself convey new information to the market,
a n dt h ea m o u n to fi n f o r m a t i o ni tw o u l dc o n v e yw o u l dd e p e n do nh o we a r l yi nt h em o n t hi to c c u r s .
The second possibility for announcements to have exchange rate impact is to break the market￿s
ability to achieve full aggregation from period-4 actions. This can be achieved, for example, by
introducing additional sources of noise. For example, one could introduce noise in the marketwide
order-￿ow statistic that agents observe (a quite realistic source of noise, given the relatively low
transparency of actual foreign exchange trading). It could also be achieved by introducing country-
level noise in the period-1 observation of the capital-return shocks ut, ￿ ut,e t,a n d￿ et (also quite
realistic). We leave these extensions to future work.
5.2 Portfolio Shifts
In our model, signed transaction ￿ows between marketmakers are the central ￿ow concept in terms
of facilitating information aggregation. At the same time, portfolios are shifting over time, so it is
worthwhile asking whether these agent-level portfolio ￿ows are also useful for understanding how
dispersed information is aggregated.28 Since the answer to this question is quite subtle, we begin
with a simple example. The example will make it clear that changes in portfolio holdings need not
be associated with information aggregation, even though signed transaction ￿ows are.
Suppose a researcher has data on the asset positions of all agents. As such, she can track aggre-












28Froot and Ramadorai (2002), Fan and Lyons (2002), and Rime (2002) use end-user portfolio ￿ow data of this
kind.
30periods j = {1,...,4}. Would changes in B
j
t and/or ￿ B
j
t b ec o r r e l a t e dw i t he x c h a n g er a t ei n n o v a t i o n s
arising from the aggregation of dispersed information? The answer is no. Changes in aggregate
holdings are determined solely by asset supply via the requirement of market clearing, so they are
unrelated to the information transmission driving the exchange rate. This is readily apparent in
our model because market clearing requires that B
j
t = ￿ B
j
t =0every period.
In practice, a researcher will not have access to data on all asset holdings in the economy, so the
issue becomes whether data on a subset of asset holdings can be usefully employed. To examine
this we need to study how asset positions change at the micro level. Consider the change in a US
agent￿s holdings of pound deposits between periods 1 and 3:
￿ B3



















The ￿rst term on the right identi￿es the individual￿s desired increase in the foreign asset position.







,v i at h eo p t i m a l
choice of λt,US, and so may convey some of this agent￿s individual information Ω2
t,US. Nevertheless,
it is the second term that plays the central role in our model as the medium for transmitting new
marketwide information. The second term is the unexpected currency orders from all other agents.
Thus, the total change in the individual￿s position is a noisy signal of the unexpected order ￿ow that
carries marketwide information, where the "noise" here is the ￿rst term￿the individual￿s desired
position change. The noise arises because, for example, an agent could want to change his foreign
asset position even when there is no dispersed information in the economy. With no dispersed
information, incoming orders in this model can be perfectly predicted, so the second term in (49)
vanishes. And, as a result, there need not be any relation between the change in asset holdings and
the exchange rate.
In the presence of dispersed information, the relation between changes in asset holdings and
exchange rates is more complex. In this case, the change in asset holdings signal the arrival of
new information to the agent, but this need not imply that changes in the exchange rate and
asset holdings are contemporaneously correlated. The reason is that information transmitted to
each agent via unexpected order ￿ow only becomes embedded in the new exchange rate when it
augments the common information set. This always happens in our model because news to US
agents in the term (T2
t,z∗ − E2
t:UST2
t,z∗) is already known to UK agents and vice versa. In general,
however, there is no guarantee that information received by each agent during trade augments the
common information set, so there is no guarantee that this information is immediately embedded
in the exchange rate.
To summarize, the revelation of information that drives exchange rates here changes the distrib-
ution of asset holdings (across US and UK agents). But going in reverse￿i.e., inferring information
31from changes in that distribution￿is diﬃcult. At the subset-of-agents level, changes in holdings
may be informative, but only to the extent that the subset captures those distribution changes that
are relevant. Put diﬀerently, changes in holdings at the individual-agent level are a noisy estimate
of the information in trades, so even when information aggregation is taking place, these individual
changes in holdings will not be strongly correlated with exchange rate changes.
5.3 Trade Composition
Our model provides interesting perspectives on the determinants of currency trading. In particular,
the model allows us to decompose order ￿ows into three components: a goods-market component
(related to the need to purchase foreign goods with foreign currency), a speculative component
(related to information about the return on foreign currency), and a hedging component (related
to the expected arrival of currency orders from other agents). These three components are readily
identi￿ed by rearranging the de￿nition of αt,z,t h ee n d - o f - m o n t h - t d e s i r e df r a c t i o no fw e a l t hh e l d
in pounds (see the period-4 problem in equation 11):
T4













The ￿rst term on the right shows the period-4 foreign currency purchases for the goods market.
As one would expect, the eﬀect is one-to-one. The second term identi￿es the desired increase
in holdings of pound assets. The speculative demand for foreign assets contributes to this term
via the choice of αt,z, which depends, in turn, on the expected excess return on deposits and
domestic capital.29 The third term identi￿es hedging against expected currency orders from other
marketmakers.
Equation (50) has two noteworthy implications in terms of currency trading volume. First,
transactions in international goods and services ( ￿ Ct,z in our model) may account for an empirically
insigni￿cant amount of FX trading, even if there are no sizable shifts in desired portfolio holdings.
Rather, trades may be driven almost exclusively by hedging against incoming orders, E4
t,zT4
t,z.
Such a situation is analogous to ￿hot potato￿ trading, a phenomenon where risky inventories are
passed between marketmakers in the process of wider risk sharing. In this model, agents rationally
anticipate incoming orders generated by unwanted inventories, rather than simply waiting for their
arrival.
The second implication of (50) is that dispersed information contributes to the variability of the
speculative component, thereby contributing to trading volume. In general, dispersed information
still exists in period 3. As a result, spot and interest rates do not impound the union of all
29Recall that for US agents, holdings of UK capital ˆ Kt,z=0.
32information sets. Under these circumstances, αt,z varies through time and across agents as they
speculate on the basis of their unimpounded information. Hence, dispersed information contributes
to the variability of the speculative component, thereby contributing to trading volume.
5.4 Incomplete Markets
Let us consider the sense in which asset markets in our model are incomplete, and under what
conditions. Though there are many de￿nitions of asset market completeness, many are not met
by our model. For example, in models with symmetric information in which agents consume each
period, markets are complete in the sense of Debreu (1959) if all possible date-states are insurable
through once-and-for-all trade at t=0. In our model, there are clearly incentives for subsequent
trade, so this de￿nition of completeness does not hold (as one might expect, given the information
asymmetries). But once-and-for-all trading is not the only basis for de￿ning completeness. Rather,
markets are called dynamically complete if all time-states are insurable through trading strate-
gies implemented over time. In symmetric information settings, necessary conditions for dynamic
completeness are well understood (see, e.g., Arrow 1970). In settings of asymmetric information,
completeness is generally much harder to achieve, and necessary conditions for doing so are much
less well understood.
In our particular setting, we focus on dynamic completeness and the conditions under which
idiosyncratic risk in our model is fully insurable. In fact, this occurs only in a very special case,
per the following proposition:
Proposition 8 There is complete risk sharing in equilibrium if and only if ρ = −1.
In this special case where the transitory capital-return shocks ut and ￿ ut perfectly reveal one another,
we know that period-3 prices are fully revealing. In this case, the equilibrium exchange rate process
is such that it insures that the returns to home and foreign capital are equalized. This occurs despite
agents not having access to foreign capital: the dollar return a US consumer would receive if he
were able to hold UK capital is exactly the same as the dollar return on US capital. The investment
opportunity sets are, in eﬀect, not restricted.
In contrast, in the general case with ρ>−1, the exchange rate process is such that the returns
on US and UK capital are not equalized. Here, the slow pace of information aggregation makes it
impossible for marketmakers to set period-3 spot rates that re￿ect true capital returns fully. The
lack of access to foreign capital now constitutes a restriction on agents￿ investment opportunity
sets.
Interestingly, if one were to allow cross-country holdings of real capital in the general case￿i.e.,
a world equity market￿risk sharing would still not be complete. Although agents would have
33access to the same investments, cross-country correlation in wealth would not be one, a necessary
condition for complete risk sharing. This is because consumers use their individual information to
choose diﬀerent portfolios. (Recall that agents still have diﬀerent information about the month t
state of the world at the start of period 4.) In equilibrium, this individual information is useful
for forecasting returns because some information about the month t state of the economy becomes
e m b e d d e di nt h ee x c h a n g er a t eo n l ya f t e rt h ee n do fp e r i o d - 4t r a d i n g .
Less than complete risk sharing in the general case is also manifest in agents￿ choice of consump-
tion/wealth ratio, δt,z. Since consumers have log preferences in our model, the optimal choice of
δt,z doesn￿t vary with the interest rate, only with expected excess returns on wealth. Gradual infor-
mation aggregation means that consumers have individual information that is useful for forecasting
excess returns. As a result, the consumption/wealth ratio, δt,z, is also a function of individual
information. (As one would expect from optimal consumption choice, δt,z remains uncorrelated
with public information, i.e., with contents of the information set Ω3
t.)
If allowing cross-country holdings of real capital is not enough in the general case to complete
the market, what would be necessary to do so? In eﬀect, what needs to be spanned by the capital
markets in this model to achieve completeness is the diﬀerences in individual information sets. In
eﬀect, one would need "information contingent" securities, i.e., assets whose payoﬀs are perfectly
correlated with the individual information used in making consumption decisions. This would be
a state-contingent security of a new kind.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The new micro model we develop here connects the DGE and microstructure approaches to exchange
rates. Though both approaches are built on solid micro-foundations, there has been a distressing
disconnect between them. DGE models need to ￿nd more traction in the data; our results suggest
that enriching their information structures (as opposed to their preference or production structures)
may provide that traction. The shortcomings of microstructure modeling are more on the theoretical
side: these models need a richer placement within the underlying real economy if they are to realize
their potential for addressing macro phenomena. It is precisely this joint need that motivates our
paper.
Methodologically, the DGE environment we study has a number of novel features. First, ￿nan-
cial markets in our model are incomplete, which, among other things, makes room for the exchange
rate to be determined from more than just the marginal rate of substitution between home and
foreign consumption goods (see Duarte and Stockman 2001). In particular, the exchange rate is
pinned down by a present-value relation in a manner familiar to the asset approach. Second, the
model embeds social learning: agents learn from the equilibrium actions of others. Third, the
34presence of social learning means that we need to solve each agent￿s decision problem and inference
problem jointly. More concretely, the solution begins with a conjecture about each agent￿s infor-
mation set, and concludes with veri￿cation that these conjectured information sets line up with
information provided by market outcomes. Fourth, our solution accounts for agent risk aversion.
Risks associated with incomplete knowledge about the state of the economy in￿uence consumption
and trading decisions (which, in turn, aﬀect the inferences agents draw from market outcomes). To
o u rk n o w l e d g e ,t h i si st h e￿rst paper to solve a DGE model with this combination of risk-averse
decision-making, heterogeneous information, and social learning.
We use the new framework to address the exchange rate determination puzzle. Though a nat-
ural puzzle to start with, the model is certainly rich enough to address a host of other important
puzzles, including forward discount bias and real exchange-rate persistence. With respect to de-
termination, we oﬀer four main results: (1) persistent gaps between exchange rates and macro
fundamentals, (2) excess volatility relative to macro fundamentals, (3) exchange rate movements
without macro news, and (4) little or no exchange rate movement when macro news occurs. Per-
sistent gaps between exchange rates and fundamentals arise in the model because the underlying
state of fundamentals￿which corresponds to the union of all information sets￿is revealed only
gradually. So, though exchange rates fully re￿ect all public information, they never re￿ect all
information. Volatility in excess of fundamentals occurs because real allocations are distorted by
(rational) expectation errors, which we call an "embedding eﬀect". These distorted real allocations
induce additional exchange rate volatility because the exchange rate, as an asset price, needs to
compensate for the persistence of these distorted real variables (a source of excess volatility missed
by partial-equilibrium microstructure analysis). Exchange rates move without macro news because
microeconomic actions￿in particular, trades￿convey information, even when public macro news
is not present. On the ￿ipside, macro news has no impact on exchange rates if the microeconomic
aggregation of information renders subsequent public announcements redundant.
Finally, our model provides a structural-economic rationale for why transaction ￿ows account
for monthly exchange rate changes quite well empirically, whereas macro variables perform poorly.
The basic idea is that when dispersed information is present, aggregate transaction ￿ows provide
a tighter signal of changing macro fundamentals. But is dispersed information present? Dispersed
information characterizes most variables at the center of exchange rate modeling, including output,
money demand, in￿ation, consumption preferences, and risk preferences. These variables are not
realized at the macro level, but rather as aggregations of underlying micro realizations. Some of
this information is being aggregated by markets, and might well prove to be an important missing
piece in exchange rate economics.
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38A Appendix
This appendix includes ￿ve sections. The ￿rst describes the model￿s solution and presents proofs
of Propositions 1-8. The second provides detail on the agents￿ optimization problems. The third
addresses market clearing conditions. The fourth provides detail on the log approximations used
to solve the model. The ￿fth derives the relationship between the marginal utility of wealth and
the marginal utility of consumption.
A.1 Solving the Model
A.1.1 Conjectured Equilibrium




t =2 θ∇et + 1
1−µ (πe∇et + πu∇ut), (A1)
s3
t − s1
t = ψξt, (A2)
rt = r + ηξt, (A3)
￿ rt = r − ηξt, (A4)









t−1 is the scaled innovation to period-2 order ￿ow (relative to
Ω2
t) that depends on all four returns shocks:
ξt ∼ = ξe∇et + ξu∇ut. (A5)
















































t,z is the order ￿ow innovation received by consumer z in






















Based on this information structure, individual and public expectations regarding productivity

























where Σε is the (exogenous) unconditional
covariance of εt.C o n s u m e rz0s choice of portfolio shares and log consumption-wealth ratio can be
written as:
λt,z = λz + λ0
zεt (A10)
ωt,z = ωz + ω0
zεt (A11)
δt,z = δz + δ0
zεt (A12)
where ω0
t,US ≡ [ αt,US γt,US ],ω 0
t,UK ≡ [ αt,UK − γt,UK γt,UK ].λ z,ω z and δz are 4 ￿ 1 vectors of
coeﬃcients, while λz,ω z and δz are constants.
A.1.2 Veriﬁcation
Decision Rules: Consider the period-4 portfolio problem. Combining the ￿rst-order conditions








































































A2We verify below that φz,t = φ. Substituting for h1











xt+1,US ≡ [ s1
t+1 − s3
t +￿ rt − rt rk
t+1 − rt ],
xt+1,UK ≡ [ s1
t+1 − s3
t +￿ rt − rt ￿ rk
t+1 + s1
t+1 − s3
t − rt ],
Σz ≡ V4
t,z [xt+1,z], Λz ≡ diag[Σz] and Ψz ≡ CV4
t,z [xt+1,z,δt+1,z]. Equation (A13) implicitly de￿nes
the optimal choice of portfolio at the start of period 4. The conjectured equilibrium interest and













(πe (ι1 − ι2)+πu (ι3 − ι4))
















(πe (ι1 − ι2)+πu (ι3 − ι4))





(πe (ι1 − ι2)+πu (ι3 − ι4))

,
where ιi selects the i￿th element in εt. Combining these equations with (A8) implies that E4
t,zxt+1,z =
xz+Bzb4























ωt,z =( 1 − µ)Σ−1
z
¡1











zεt = ωz + ω0
zεt,
as shown in (A11).
To verify the form of the log consumption-wealth ratio, we ￿rst combine (31) (with φt,z = φz)
and (27) to give















t+1,z with (A74) and (A13), we can rewrite this equation as

















A3Combining this expression with (A11) and taking a second-order approximation around εt =0
gives



























= δz + δ0
zεt,
as shown in (A12).
To verify the form of the period-2 portfolio choice, we write the linearized ￿rst-order condition

















































































Under our proposed solution for the interest and exchange rate processes in (A1)- (A4), xt+1,z is





















=0 . Substituting this restriction


























t,z∇ut. Now, given the information
structure in (A6), E2
t,US∇et = et, E2
t,UK∇et = −￿ et, E2
t,US∇ut =( 1− ρ)ut and E2
t,UK∇ut =( ρ − 1) ￿ ut.

































2 (1 − ρ2)σ2
u. This is the form of (A10).

































εt. Combining this approximation with (A1), rewrit-
ten as s1
t+1 − s3











































Now (A47) and (A51) imply that s3
t −∇kt = πe∇et +πu∇ut = π0εt. Combining these results with









2 (ι1 − ι3)V4
t,US [εt](δUK + π)
=
µθ


















2 (ι1 − ι3)V4
t,UK [εt](δUS − π)
= −
µθ









¢0 (δUS − π). (A25)
Substituting the results in (A23), (A24) and (A25) into the de￿nitions shown in (A21) and (A22)
establishes that φt,z is a constant.
Information Structure: At the start of period 1, consumers observe home productivity shocks
so that {et,u t} ∈ Ω2
t,US and {￿ et, ￿ ut} ∈ Ω2
t,UK. Expectations of the productivity shocks can be




















.ε t,z denotes the
vector of shocks directly observed by consumer z at the start of period 1. Since productivity shocks


















where ιUS ≡ (ι1 + ι3) and ιUK ≡ (ι1 + ι3) a ss h o w ni n( A 8 )f o ri =1 . Since no new information
arrives during period 1, Ω2
t,z = Ω1
t,z and hence b1
z = b2
z. (A8) implies that E2
t,US￿ et = E2
t,UKet =0 ,
A5E2
t,US￿ ut = ρut and E2
t,UKut = ρ￿ ut. Since the elements of εt are not common knowledge by the start















=0 . This is the form of (A9) for i = {1,2} with
bi =0 .
Next, we consider the information that accrues between the start of periods 2 and 3. Under



















t,zdz, with the de￿nitions
of T2













































t−1,zdz is world-wide wealth. Bond-market clearing implies that W2
t−1 = S1
t−1 ￿ Kt−1 + Kt−1,
which according to the conjectured information structure in (A7) is common-knowledge at t:1 (i.e.,
W2
t−1 ∈ Ω1































































































































A6Recall that bond-market clearing implies that Wi
t,US + Wi
t,UK = Kt + Si−1
t ￿ Kt, or
wi












for i = {1,3}. Approximating the right hand side around the steady state gives,
wi
t,US − kt ∼ = si−1
t + ￿ kt − wi
t,UK, (A28)
for i = {1,3}. Linearizing (A27) around the steady state and combining the result with (A28) for
i =2 ,w e￿nd:















Substituting for λt,US and λt,UK with (A19) and (A20) gives













where λe = ψξe/σ2
s and λu = ψξu(1−ρ)/σ2
s. Substituting for s1
t −∇kt with (A52) (derived below)
gives
















To determine the expectations terms, E2
t,USξt and E2
t,UKξt, we guess and verify that ξt =  e∇et +
 e∇ut for some coeﬃcients  i. Under our information structure, this guess implies that E2
t,USξt =
 eet +  u (1 − ρ)ut and E2
t,UKξt = − e￿ et −  u (1 − ρ)￿ ut. Substituting these expressions into our













∼ = ξe∇et + ξu∇ut = ξ0εt,
as shown in (A5).
Inferences about the vector of productivity shocks based on Ω3




































¢−1 Σεξξ0ξεt = b3εt,
A7which is the form of (A9) with i =3 .
Inferences about the productivity shocks based on Ω4






ξt,z denote the re-scaled unexpected order ￿ow consumer z received during period-
2t r a d i n g .S i n c eW2
t,z/βRW2
t−1 ∈ Ω1
t,z, we can use ￿ ξt,z to represent individual information accruing
to consumer z between the start of periods 2 and 4. (Since period-3 spot rates are a function of
Ω3
t, no new individual information accrues between the start of periods 3 and 4.) Combining the
















Using (A7) to evaluate the expectations terms on the right, we ￿nd that
￿ ξt,US ∼ = −ξe￿ et + ξu (ρut − ￿ ut)=￿ ξ
0
USεt, (A34)
￿ ξt,UK ∼ = ξeet + ξu (ut − ρ￿ ut)=￿ ξ
0
UKεt. (A35)






































































































which is the form of (A8) for i =4 .
Next, we examine the information revealed by period-4 order ￿o w .A si np e r i o d2 ,a l lc o n s u m e r s



















t,zdz, with the de￿nitions of T4
t , the target fraction of wealth in










































































































Linearizing this expression around the steady state (where αt,z = αz =( 1− µ)/2, δt,z =0 ,W2
t,US =
Kt,W 2
t,UK = ￿ Kt,a n dS3
t = Kt/ ￿ Kt), gives
ςt ∼ = 1








+( ∆kt − ∆k)
⁄
+1

































Combining this approximation with (A28) (for i =4 ) ,we ￿nd that
ςt = 1
2 (αt,US − αUS)+1
2 (αt,UK − αUK)
+
µ







Substituting for ∇kt − s3




















where αt,z ≡  zωt,z. As above, we solve this equation with the guess and verify method using (A8)
to give
ςt ∼ = Φeet + Φˆ e￿ et + Φuut + Φˆ u￿ ut. (A38)
































with Φ ≡ [ Φe Φˆ e Φu Φˆ u ].
To establish that φt,z is constant, we need to identify the unexpected order ￿ows received by
each consumer in period-4 trading, and unexpected export orders. Innovations in period-4 order









. Taking a log-linear approximation
around the steady state values of W2
t−1,W4







approximation with (A38) and (A9) gives







We approximate unexpected export orders ζt,US and ￿ ζt,UK in a similar manner. To approximate








t − ￿ kt + s3









t,US − kt + ∇kt − s3
t + s3
t + ￿ kt − wt,UK
·
.

































δt,US + ∇kt − s3
t +2 ( s3
t + ￿ kt − wt,UK)
·
. (A41)
Using (A40) to substitute for Ct,UK/W4






















t ￿ Ct,US = Ct,US in equilibrium,
￿ ζt,UK ≡ S3
t
‡
















So substituting for Ct,US/W4
t,UK, with (A41) in the latter expression gives








The ￿nal step is to show how (A32) and (A38) can be combined with elements of Ω4
t,z so that





for z = {US,UK}. For the case of US consumers, we rewrite (A32) and
A10(A38) as:
χ2
t,US ≡ ξt − ξeet − ξuut = −ξe￿ et − ξu￿ ut,
χ4
t,US ≡ ςt − Φeet − Φuut = Φˆ e￿ et + Φˆ u￿ ut.
χ2
t,US and χ4
t,US provide two signals of the values of ￿ et and ￿ ut that can be constructed from informa-























￿ ut = −
￿
1







Similarly, UK consumers can combine their observations of order ￿ow from periods 2 and 4 with
their knowledge of ￿ ut and ￿ et to infer the values of et and ut precisely. Thus, {et, ￿ et,u t, ￿ ut} are
indeed common knowledge after period-4 trading. This completes the veri￿cation of the information
structure shown in (A6) - (A9).
Exchange and Interest Rates: We now verify that processes for exchange rates and interest
rates implied the equilibrium quotes made in periods 1 and 3 follow (A1)-(A4). To derive the
exchange rate process we ￿rst combine the capital accumulation equations, (35) and (36), to give:









Combining this equation with the identity s3






t −∇ kt gives
s3




























































which is equation (40) in the text.















































for i>1 by iterated expectations, the








































































Applying the conditional expectations operator E1




































t. Notice that this restriction follows as an implication of market clearing and
rational expectations (it does not rely on any approximations). As such, it must hold true for any
equilibrium distribution of wealth, including the case where Wt,US = Wt,UK = S1
t ￿ Kt ∈ Ω1
t. Under


























































































=0 . Notice that we would not be able to
derive this simple implication of rational expectations and market clearing if hedging terms were








=0with (A47) gives us the




Equilibrium exchange rate dynamics are derived by combining (A47) and (A49) with (A44).
For this purpose, we take expectations conditioned on Ω1














































(st−1 −∇ kt−1) − E3
t [st−1 −∇ kt−1]
¢
.
Under our information structure, {st−1,∇kt−1,∇et−1} ∈ Ω3
t, so this expression simpli￿es to
∇kt − E3















with ı ≡ [ 1 −11−1 ]. The form of the πi
coeﬃcients follow from (A33) and (A5). Combining (A51), (A50) and the fact that E1
t+1∇rk
t+1 =
A132θ∇et under our information structure, gives
s1
t+1 − s3
t =2 θ∇et + 1
1−µ (πe∇et + πu∇ut),
as shown in (A1).
We can also use (A50) and (A44) to calculate the value of s1
t −∇ kt used in the derivation of
period-2 order ￿ow above. Speci￿cally, by combining (A50) and (A44) we can write
s1














According to the conjectured information structure in (A7), ∇kt−1 and ∇et−1 are common knowl-
edge by t:1, i.e., {∇kt−1,∇et−1} ∈ Ω1
t. This means that the second term in the expression above






t = −∇et−∇ut. Substituting these results into the
equation above gives
s1
t −∇ kt = −∇et −∇ ut. (A52)
To derive (A2), we take expectations conditioned on Ω3




























































[∇et + ∇ut].S i n c eE1
tεt =0 , the latter term simpli￿es to E3
t [∇et + ∇ut].
Now (A33) and (A5) imply that E3




t = ıK3ξt = ψξt,
as shown in (A2).
Finally, we turn to the interest rate quotes made in period 3. From (A39), (A42) and (A43) we
see that innovations to period-4 order ￿ow, ςt,z, and exports, ζt,US and ￿ ζt,UK,d e p e n do nt h ec h o i c e s
for ωt,z and δt,z made at the start of the period. This means that ωt,z and δt,z cannot be functions of
Ω3
t,o t h e r w i s eςt,z,ζ t,US and ￿ ζt,UK would not be orthogonal to Ω3
t as rational expectations requires.
For this to be the case, expected excess returns on capital cannot be correlated with elements of
A14Ω3




￿ rt = E3
t￿ rk
t+1. (A55)
Given the process for capital returns, and the conjecture information structure, these equations
become
r = r + θE3
t∇et
= r + θ(ι1 − ι2)K3ξt, (A56)
￿ r = r − θE3
t∇et
= r − θ(ι1 − ι2)K3ξt, (A57)
where K3 is de￿ned in (A33). Equations (A56) and (A57) take the same form as (A3) and (A4)
with η = θ(ι1 − ι2)K3.
A.1.3 Equilibrium when ρ = −1
When ρ = −1, equilibrium interest rates and the exchange rate follow
s1
t+1 − s3
t = ∇ut+1 +2 θ∇et, (A58)
s3
t − s1
t = ∇et, (A59)
rt = r + θ∇et, (A60)
￿ rt = r − θ∇et, (A61)




















































A15Unexpected order ￿ow in period-2 is perfectly correlated with ∇et, while order ￿o w si np e r i o d4
















The consumption-wealth ratio and period-4 portfolio shares are constant.
We can verify that these equations describe the equilibrium following the procedure described
above. In this special case things are much simpler, so we will just outline the argument. We start
with the observation that {ut, ￿ ut} ∈ Ω1
t because the ￿u￿ shocks are perfectly (negatively) correlated.
Thus, the ￿e￿ shocks are the only source of individual information at the start of period-2 trading.
In equilibrium, consumers use this information in choosing their desired portfolio, as (A64) shows,





for all z,s ot h e￿ e￿ shocks become common knowledge by the start of period 3. This means that
E3
t∇kt = ∇kt, E1
t∇Rk







t = ∇et. Substituting these results into





t+1 = −θ∇et, so (A60) and (A61) follow from (A54) and (A55). All that now remains is
to verify the form of the decision rules. (A58) - (A62) imply that the vector of expected excess
returns E4
t,zxt+1,z are zero. Under these circumstances, (A14) and (A15) imply that ωt,z and δt,z
are constant. Equation (A64) follows from (A17), (A59) and (27).
A.1.4 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1: The results in this proposition follow directly from (A47) and (A49) above.
Proposition 2: The equilibria above show that {et−1, ￿ et−1} ∈ Ω1
t,s ot h es h o c k sut,e t ￿ ut and ￿ et
represent all the new information about the month t state of the economy. Under our assumptions,
{ut,e t} ∈ Ω1
US,t and {￿ ut, ￿ et} ∈ Ω1
UK,t, so {ut,e t ￿ ut ￿ et} 6∈ Ω1
t ≡∩ zΩ1
z,t when ρ>−1. When ρ = −1,
{ut, ￿ ut} ∈ Ω1
t ≡∩ zΩ1
z,t, so some new information about the month t state becomes common
knowledge in period t:1.
Proposition 3: The only part of the proposition not covered in section A.1.2 concerns the values
of πe and πu. We argue by contradiction to show that πe 6=0and πu 6=0 .I fπe =( 1− ψξe)=0















e +( 1− ρ2)σ2
u
¢−1 ,
λu =( 1 − ρ)
¡
σ2
e +( 1− ρ2)σ2
u
¢−1 ,
from (A18). Combining these expressions with the equation above gives
¡
σ2





Proposition 4: This proposition is proved in the subsection verifying the form of the information
structure.
Proposition 5: To derive the equation in this proposition we simply combine the results in (A44)
and (A47).
Proposition 6: The ￿rst variance expression follows directly from the capital returns processes
(8a) and (8b), and the exchange rate equations (A58) and (A59). To derive the second expression
we combine (A1) and (A2) to give
∆s3






Substituting for ξt+1 with (A5), we obtain
∆s3






= ψξe∇et+1 + ψξu∇ut+1 + ∇rk







































































The ￿rst term in unambiguously positive because πe > 0. The second term is positive if πu >





. Note that ﬂ πu < 1 because 1 >µ>0, so ﬂ πu is the lower bound on πu suﬃcient to
generate excess volatility.
A17Proposition 7: We established in (A47) and (A49) that the equilibrium log exchange rate can






,f o ri = {1,3}, where Ωi
t denotes the public information set at t:i
identi￿ed in (A7) without announcements. Thus, a public announcement concerning the values of
rk
t and ￿ rk














t+1, announcements made after t:4 have no exchange rate eﬀe c t sb e c a u s ea l lt h ei n f o r m a t i o n
they contain has been aggregated by consumers via trading. Suppose the announcement is made
in t:3. Equation (A51) implies that ∇kt = E3





















= πe∇et + πu∇ut.
Under these circumstances, the eﬀect of the announcement on the exchange rate is identi￿ed by
the second term in
s3
t − s1
t = ψξt +( πe∇et + πu∇ut).













= ∇kt − E
h
∇rk










= ∇et + ∇ut.
Proposition 8: When ρ = −1, we established above that the consumption-wealth ratios δt,z are
constant. We therefore need to show that corr(∆wt,US,∆wt,UK)=1to establish complete risk













(γt,UK − ￿ ζt,UK)W4
t,UK.
















When ρ = −1,s 3
t = ∇kt, and ∆s3
t+1−∇rk
t+1,s ot h e￿rst term in parentheses on the right equals zero.
To evaluate the second term, recall that when ρ = −1 the month t state of the economy is common
knowledge by that the start of period 3. Hence, ￿ ζt,UK = ζt,US =0 . Furthermore, γt,UK and γt,US are
constant. Thus, the (A65) simpli￿es to w4
t,US = w4







To establish the absence of complete risk sharing in the ρ>−1 case, we argue by contradiction.
A18Suppose there is complete risk sharing so that the marginal utilities of US and UK consumers are
always equal. Given log utility, this implies that ct,US = ct,UK in all states of the world, including
the state where wt,US = wt,UK. In this state, complete risk sharing implies that δt,US = δt,UK. It also
implies that the demand for exports is perfectly predictable because home and foreign consumption
are perfectly correlated. This means that δt,UK = ∇kt − s3
t and δt,US = s3
t −∇ kt from (A42) and
(A43). Combining these equations with the other implication, δt,US = δt,UK, implies that s3
t = ∇kt,
a restriction that is violated by the equilibrium spot rate when ρ>−1.
A.2 Optimization Problems (Equations 9 — 19)
To derive the budget constraint in (10), we use the de￿nitions of the intra-month desired portfolio
share in pounds, λt,z, and the period-2 order ￿ow, ξt, together with the intraday dynamics of US





















(Note that agents only hold domestic capital, so that Kt,z =0for z ≥ 1/2 and ￿ Kt,z =0for

















Now we turn to deriving equations (13)￿(19), the ￿rst-order conditions describing consumption


















t,z respectively denote unexpected order ￿ow, unexpected US export
demand, and unexpected UK export demand (all measured relative to period-4 wealth). Then
using the de￿nitions of αt,z, and γt,z, together with the overnight dynamics of deposits and capital























A19Substituting these expressions into the de￿nition of W2





















































t ￿ Kt+1,z = ￿ Rk
t+1(γt,z − ￿ ζt,z)W4
t,z.




































w h i c hi st h eU Kv e r s i o no f( 1 2 ) .




























where DJz(.) denotes the derivative of Jz(.). The ￿rst-order conditions for Ct,z, ￿ Ct,z, and λt,z in the
period-4 problem take the same form for US and UK agents:































A20The ￿rst-order conditions for γt,z diﬀer:












































Equations (13) - (19) are obtained by combining (A66) - (A73) with Vt,z ≡ DJ4
z(W4
t,z).
A.3 Market Clearing Conditions
For any variable X, let Xt,US denote Xt,z for z<1/2, and Xt,UK = Xt,z for z ≥ 1/2. Market clearing











t,UK − Ct,UK)=0 .









t,UK − It,US =0 .








t,z∗dz∗, this condition im-
plies that It,US =0 . Imposing this restriction on the overnight dynamics of US capital gives (22).




t,z∗ − ￿ Ct,US)+(￿ B1
t,UK + T4
t,UK − T4





t,z∗ − ￿ It,US
= −￿ It,US.
Imposing ￿ It,UK =0on the overnight dynamics of UK capital gives (23).
A.4 Log Approximations
To approximate log portfolio returns we make use of a second-order approximation similar to the








t,z =l n[ 1+( ex − 1)(a − u)+( ey − 1)(b − w)]
where x,y,u, and w are random variables that are zero in the steady state. Taking a second-order
Taylor series approximation to h
j
t,z around this point gives:
h
j








(b − b2)y2 − abxy − xu − yw.
The ￿nal step is to replace x2,y2, xy, xu, and yw by their respective moments:
h
j








(b − b2)V[y] − abCV[x,y] − CV[x,u] − CV[y,w]
Campbell and Viceira (2002) show that the approximation error associated with this expression dis-
appears in the limit when x,y,u and w represent realizations of continuous-time diﬀusion processes.
Applying this approximation to the de￿nitions of lnH1
t+1,z and lnH3
t,z yields equations (24),








t,zΣzωt,z − φt,z, (A74)
where Σz ≡ V4


























































for z ≥ 1/2.
Our solution also makes use of approximations to the capital dynamics in (35) and (36). To


















A22Log linearizing this equation gives:















t,UK − kt + δt,UK
¢
.
Now, deposit-market clearing implies that Kt + S3
















t + ￿ kt − kt − (w4
t,UK − kt).
Combining these equations gives (35). We approximate dynamics of UK capital in a similar manner.



































where the second line follows from the fact that the ￿rst-order conditions for consumption imply
that Ct,z = S3
t ￿ Ct,z for all z. Log linearizing this equation gives (36).
A.5 Marginal Utility of Wealth
T h es e c t i o na d d r e s s e st h em a r g i n a lu t i l i t yo fw e a l t ha n dw h yi tc a nd e p a r ti nt h i sm o d e lf r o mt h e
marginal utility of consumption. To derive the relationship between the marginal utility of wealth












































































































































Combining these expressions we obtain equation (28). In the case of UK agents, we work with log













































































Proceeding as before with our approximation for ht+1,z for z ≥ 1/2 gives (A79) and (A80). Hence,
equation (28) holds for UK agents.
A24